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Six Cases in Search of a Decision: The Story of In
re Marriage Cases
Patricia A. Cain and Jean C. Love
―Whatever is a reality today, whatever you touch and believe in and that seems real for
you today, is going to be — like the reality of yesterday — an illusion tomorrow.‖1
On May 15, 2008, the Supreme Court of California handed down its decision in the much
awaited litigation officially known as In re Marriage Cases.2 The case was actually a
consolidation of six individual cases, all raising the same issue: Is denial of marriage to same-sex
couples valid under the California Constitution? These six cases, as with Pirandello‘s six
characters in search of an author, took center stage for a time, not in a real theater, but rather in
the evolving drama over extending equal marriage rights to gay men and lesbians. And while the
case, like Pirandello‘s play, does conclude, the story remains unfinished. The Supreme Court‘s
decision opened the institution of marriage, making it equally accessible to same-sex couples in
California. But the reality of that day became an illusion in the tomorrow that produced
Proposition 8, the ballot initiative that limited marriage to heterosexual couples. Of course, it is
possible that tomorrow‘s reality will turn Proposition 8 into an illusion, but that story has yet to
be written, even as other states such as Iowa recognize the validity of same-sex marriage.
Background
On January 20, 2004, President George W. Bush in his State of the Union Address said:
A strong America must also value the institution of marriage . . . . Activist judges,
however, have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for the will of
the people and their elected representatives. On an issue of such great consequence, the
people‘s voice must be heard. If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the
people, the only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional process. Our
nation must defend the sanctity of marriage.
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Gavin Newsom, the newly elected mayor of San Francisco, heard that speech and felt a
sense of outrage at the discriminatory force of Bush‘s statement, a clear reference to the 2003
Massachusetts decision that had extended the right of marriage in that state to same-sex couples.3
Newsom called his office and asked his staff to begin researching what he, as mayor, might do to
defend the sanctity of marriage for gay men and lesbians.
Newsom had been mayor of San Francisco for exactly 18 days. 4 The mayoral campaign
had not been an easy one. Challenged in the run-off election by Green Party candidate, Matt
Gonzalez, Newsom outspent Gonzalez ten to one. His $4.0 million campaign produced a margin
of victory measured by 11,000 votes. Liberal groups in San Francisco had branded Newsom as
more conservative or a centrist and tended to support Gonzalez.
Nevertheless, this conservative, centrist, heterosexual, first-term mayor forced same-sex
marriage into the courts in California by taking a courageous stand in favor of marriage equality.
Within three weeks of President Bush‘s State of the Union address, Mayor Newsom had
authorized the issuance of marriage licenses to lesbian and gay couples. On Thursday, February
12, 2004, Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, legendary feminists and lesbian activists, became the
first couple in California to be legally wed.
Couples flocked to City Hall to take advantage of this momentous happening. Within
twenty-four hours of the first weddings, however, on Friday, February 13, two anti-gay
organizations, Campaign for California Families and Proposition 22 Legal Defense and
Education Fund, together with anti-gay activist Randy Thomasson, filed two separate suits in
superior court seeking to enjoin the Mayor‘s office from issuing any further marriage licenses to
gay and lesbian couples. The superior court did not issue an immediate stay, finding that the
complainants would not be irreparably harmed in any way by the continued issuance of marriage
licenses. Instead, the court ordered the City either to cease issuing licenses or to ―show cause‖
on March 29 why it should not.
On February 14, Valentine‘s Day, Barbara and Renee Webster-Hawkins lined up with
300 other couples. It was Saturday morning, but City Hall staff members worked overtime to
issue licenses and perform ceremonies. The couple in front of them was from Amador County
and the couple behind them was from San Diego. Instant bonding occurred as this mass of
couples shared the seriousness of the moment. Gone were the hecklers of the first day and,
although some news stations remained, most of the people outside City Hall were ordinary
people just grateful for the opportunity that Mayor Newsom had provided. Five hours later
Barbara and Renee finally made it inside the building, holding the single rose that a stranger had
handed them. Within minutes, after swearing they were the two people named on the license
application, an officiant led them to a private chamber where two strangers, now new friends,
witnessed their vows.
The demand for marriage licenses by same-sex couples was so strong that City Hall had
to adopt new procedures to alleviate the problems caused by the long lines that had formed
outside the building in the early days. The clerk‘s office began scheduling appointments for the
3
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future. Couples were frantic to get on the appointment calendar, aware that there were legal
challenges to the mayor‘s decision and that a court ruling might halt the issuance of licenses at
any moment.
On February 25, 2004, three taxpayers filed a petition in the California Supreme Court
seeking a writ of mandate to compel the county clerk to cease and desist issuing marriage
licenses to same-sex couples and requesting an immediate stay. Two days later, Attorney
General William Lockyer filed a similar petition requesting the Supreme Court to exercise
original jurisdiction in this matter, to order compliance with the marriage laws as written, to
invalidate all same-sex marriages performed to date, and to issue an immediate stay. The
unusual circumstances and the uncertainty of the legality of the weddings created sufficient
reasons for the Supreme Court to intervene. The court consolidated the cases and asked the City
to respond by March 5.
By midday on March 11, San Francisco had issued marriage licenses to over 4,000
couples.5 Thousands of additional couples had contacted the clerk‘s office and been assigned
appointment dates that stretched forward for months. Jeanne Rizzo and Pali Cooper, together for
15 years, had called the clerk‘s office repeatedly, reaching a busy signal. Finally, they got
through and scheduled an appointment for March 11 at 3:00 p.m. They went to City Hall that
day, accompanied by their son, Christopher, and about 50 family members and friends. The two
women wore flower necklaces. Garry Schermann and Eric Temple, both dressed in wedding
suits, were also in line at 2:45 p.m. that day, waiting to formalize their vows. Garry‘s mother had
flown in from Dallas just that morning to be a witness to the nuptials. Other couples were filling
out wedding license applications, saying their vows, and taking their licenses to AssessorRecorder Mabel Teng for filing. None of these couples was aware that, at 2:33 p.m., the
California Supreme Court would issue a stay to discontinue the issuance of same-sex marriage
licenses.6
When the issuance of the stay was announced, Jeanne and Pali, who had been looking
forward to this day for over fifteen years, broke into tears and held onto each other. Devin Baker
and Art Adams, also scheduled for a 3:00 p.m. ceremony, were halfway through filling out their
form when the clerk told them to stop. Baker says he was heartbroken. Wedding ceremonies that
were in progress were completed, but the couples were unable to file their licenses.
Del and Phyllis, Barbara and Renee, and the other 4,035 couples who had been married
over the past month, wondered whether their marriages would survive the California Supreme
Court‘s scrutiny. Many couples readily admitted that they expected an adverse ruling by the
5
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high court. Still, their vows during that month were more than mere street theatre. They were
real, carrying deep significance. Witnesses at these weddings often broke into tears as they
heard officiants say: ―By virtue of the authority vested in me by the State of California, I now
pronounce you spouses for life.‖ The thought that the State of California stood behind these
unions was enormously empowering.
These wedding experiences transformed families. Six weeks after their February 14
wedding, Barbara and Renee memorialized the event by speaking the exact same vows with a
new officiant in the company of 150 family members and friends. Although they had been
together for 12 years, this was the first opportunity for their families to acknowledge the
importance of their commitment to each other. Barbara‘s sister, Wendy Webster Williams, a
lawyer,7 toasted them at this event, concluding with the following words about legality:
The legality of Barbara and Renee‘s marriage is fragile, for better or for worse in the
hands of the Justices of California Supreme Court. But the reality of their marriage is
not. In our two families, . . . joined together by Barb & Renee‘s long partnership, no
court can take this marriage away. It is irrevocable.8
On August 12, 2004, the California Supreme Court announced its legal conclusion about
the marriages from San Francisco‘s ―Winter of Love.‖ In Lockyer v. City and County of San
Francisco,9 the California Supreme Court declared that all of the 4,037 marriages were void,
explaining that the mayor did not have the power under the separation of powers doctrine to
ignore the clear statutory law of California that restricted marriage to a man and a woman. Even
those couples who had expected the outcome were crushed by this pronouncement.
The court in Lockyer left open the question of whether or not the statutory restriction of
marriage to one man and one woman violated the California Constitution, as Mayor Newsom
believed it did. The determination of the constitutionality of such a statute, explained the court,
was not an appropriate function for the Mayor or for any other member of the executive branch
in California. Such a determination was within the sole province of the judiciary. The story of In
re Marriage Cases begins here. It is the story of the litigation in six consolidated cases that
determined the constitutionality of restricting marriage to one man and one woman.

How Six Cases Came to Court

7
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Five of the six cases in the consolidated appeal to the California Supreme Court arose
directly out of San Francisco‘s ―Winter of Love.‖ Two of the cases had been filed against Mayor
Newsom on behalf of the two conservative public interest groups who had sought to halt the
mayor‘s issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. These two cases were styled
Thomasson v. Newsom10 and Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund v. City and
County of San Francisco. The National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) intervened in these
cases on behalf of same-sex couples who had obtained and were seeking marriage licenses. On
March 11, when the California Supreme Court granted the stay that halted the issuance of
marriage licenses, it also stayed the proceedings in Thomasson and Proposition 22 Legal Defense
and Education Fund.
Three additional cases were filed on March 12. One was filed by the city, City and
County of San Francisco v. State of California. The second, Woo v. Lockyer, was filed by NCLR
primarily on behalf of twelve same-sex couples. Private attorney Waukeen McCoy filed a third
case, Clinton v. California, on behalf of six same-sex couples, and requested that the case be
tried as a class action. The last case, Tyler v. California, had been filed by private attorney
Gloria Allred in Los Angeles on February 24. In June, all of the cases other than Clinton were
coordinated for trial by Judge Richard Kramer of the Superior Court of California for the County
and City of San Francisco. The Clinton plaintiffs petitioned for coordination in July and, on
September 8, 2004, Judge Kramer ordered the consolidation of all six cases.
NCLR objected to the inclusion of Thomasson and Proposition 22 Legal Defense and
Education Fund in the consolidated proceedings. While these two cases had neither been
dismissed nor received a final ruling, NCLR argued that the supreme court‘s issuance of a stay
on March 11 had effectively granted these petitioners the remedy they had sought. The City and
County of San Francisco similarly argued that the petitioners in these two cases lacked standing
and that their claims had been mooted by the issuance of the stay. Perhaps out of an abundance
of caution, Judge Kramer denied these requests and allowed the two conservative groups to
participate in the litigation and to articulate their own justifications for retaining the traditional
heterosexual definition of marriage.
The couples in the NCLR case included Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, the first couple to
be married on February 12. Two of the couples scheduled for 3:00 p.m. marriages at City Hall
on March 11 were also plaintiffs: Jeanne Rizzo and Pali Cooper and Arthur Adams and Devin
Baker. Six additional couples joined these plaintiffs. All of the couples were registered
domestic partners. Many of them had children. All of the couples had compelling stories. Of
particular interest is the story of Stuart Gaffney and John Lewis, who had been together for
seventeen years in 2004 and who had married at City Hall on February 12. Stuart‘s parents,
Estelle Lau, who was Chinese-American, and Mason Gaffney, who was of English-Irish descent,
had met at the University of California, Berkeley and married in 1952. That marriage had been
forbidden in California until the 1948 opinion in Perez v. Sharp,11 which struck down
California‘s anti-miscegenation statute. Stuart describes his childhood as one in which his
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family‘s status changed as they moved from state to state, at least until 1967, when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia.12
The Tyler case filed in Los Angeles originated from a February 12 incident unrelated to
Mayor Newsom‘s decision to issue marriage licenses. February 12 is National Freedom to
Marry Day, a day first proclaimed as such in 1997 by Evan Wolfson, a gay rights attorney who
has supported the right to marry throughout his career.13 On this day, couples around the country
are encouraged to go to the office of their county clerks and demand marriage licenses. Robin
Tyler and her partner, Diane Olson, engaged in this annual rite by trekking down to the Beverly
Hills clerk‘s office every February and asking for a license. When the clerk refused Robin and
Diane‘s request, Robin, a regular blogger for the Huffington Post, announced that she would file
suit. On February 24, her attorney, Gloria Allred, filed a claim on behalf of Tyler and Olson,
who were joined in the lawsuit by another couple, Rev. Troy Perry14 and Phillip Ray deBliek.
The last case added to the consolidated group, Clinton v. California, was filed on behalf
of six same-sex couples, all of whom had obtained marriage licenses from the City and County
of San Francisco on February 13 and 14, 2004. Interestingly, the complaint alleges that the
California marriage statutes violate both the state and federal constitutions. The plaintiffs
dropped the claim regarding the Federal Constitution by the time the parties began briefing. As a
result, all of the challenges to the constitutionality of the state statute were limited to state
constitutional claims.
Legal Threads
Three legal threads weave the background to the story of the California Marriage Cases.
The first thread involves the California Constitution. The second thread is the 1948 decision by
the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Sharp, the case that first recognized a fundamental
right to marry the person of one‘s choice. The third thread involves California‘s special history
in the struggle for gay and lesbian equality.
1. The California Constitution
The plaintiffs in the California Marriage Cases alleged that they suffered a denial of their
state constitutional rights to liberty, privacy, and equality. The right to liberty can be traced back
to 1849, when the framers of the California Constitution decided that Article I would be called
the ―Declaration of Rights.‖15 Article I, Section 1 announced in ringing terms: ―All men are by
12
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nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness.‖ Although most of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights
were based upon New York‘s 1846 constitution and Iowa‘s constitution of the same year, 16 it is
quite possible that Article I, Section 1, was modeled upon the Virginia Bill of Rights, 17 which
codified the teachings of natural law.18 To emphasize that the Declaration of Rights would be
interpreted as positive law, the framers further stated in Article I, Section 26: ―The provisions of
this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.‖ Thus, the right to liberty in the California Constitution is neither hortatory nor
advisory; rather, it is unquestionably subject to judicial enforcement.19
The framers of the California Constitution considered it important to ensure that the
Declaration of Rights would be judicially enforceable in the California courts because they were
keenly aware of the fact that the United States Supreme Court had ruled in Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore20 that the federal Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, and not to the
states. Myron Norton, the Chairperson of the Standing Committee on the Constitution, said:
―The fact that [these rights in the federal Bill of Rights are guaranteed] in the Constitution of the
United States does us no good here; for it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States that these provisions only apply in the United States Courts.‖21
In 1879, the delegates to the second California constitutional convention reaffirmed the
text of Article I, section 1.22 By then, the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified, creating
federal constitutional rights that were enforceable against the states. But, in the early 1870s, the
United States Supreme Court narrowed the potentially broad scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases.23 Consequently, the 1879 delegates were determined
that California‘s Declaration of Rights would not depend on the United States Constitution for
either its meaning or effect. They soundly rejected a proposal to add language providing that the
Constitution of the United States is ―the great charter of our liberties.‖24 During the debate on
that proposal, several of the delegates emphasized the fact that the state constitution was in
16
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Const. L.Q. 141, 142–43 (2004) [hereinafter Grodin, The Early Years].
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reality the true charter of their liberties.25 The delegates ultimately adopted the unremarkable
declaration that the ―State of California is an inseparable part of the Union and the United States
Constitution is the supreme law of the land.‖26
The right to liberty in Article I, Section 1, has been broadly construed by the California
Supreme Court to include ―a ‗right of privacy‘ or ‗liberty‘ in matters related to marriage, family,
and sex.‖27 In 1969, the California Supreme Court interpreted the right to liberty expansively to
encompass ―the fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children.‖28 Later, in
1972, Article I, Section 1 was amended through the initiative process so that it would explicitly
apply to women as well as to men, and so that it would explicitly guarantee the right to privacy.29
Article I, Section 1 now states: ―All people are by nature free and independent and have certain
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness and
privacy.‖ It is Article I, Section 1, with its explicit references to ―liberty‖ and ―privacy,‖ that is
the primary source of the ―right to marry‖ under the California Constitution.
Article I, Section 1 contains no explicit reference to ―equality,‖ which is the third
constitutional right that was at issue in the California Marriage Cases. It has been suggested that
the 1849 Constitution contained an implicit right to equality in the inclusive language of Article
I, Section 1, which stated: ―All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain
inalienable rights . . . .‖ This argument is quite persuasive. At the same time, it must be noted
that the record of the 1849 debates shows that the failure to make any explicit reference to
equality in Article I, Section 1 was a conscious choice (although the record does not reveal the
reasons for that choice). The record shows that, in the early days of the 1849 Convention, a
delegate named Mr. Shannon moved the ―first section‖ of the ―bill of rights,‖ starting with the
statement: ―All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights . . . .‖30 Mr. Jones, another delegate, immediately moved ―to strike out the first section of
the bill and insert the first section of the Constitution of Iowa,‖31 which stated: ―All men are, by
nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights . . . .‖ The Chair ruled that Mr. Jones‘
proposed amendment was not in order.32 In response, Mr. Jones moved to strike the entirety of
Section 1 as written by Mr. Shannon.33 Mr. Botts, a third delegate, expressed his approval of Mr.
25

Id.

26
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People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199–200 (Cal. 1969) (citing cases, including Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal.
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28
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Jones‘ motion because he considered ―the first section superfluous.‖34 Mr. Sempler, a fourth
delegate, rose to respond by saying that he considered Section 1 ―an essential principle to be
incorporated in a bill of rights.‖35 After some additional discussion about the order of the
amendments, the delegates voted on Mr. Shannon‘s motion and adopted it by majority vote.36
Thus, Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution of 1849 expressly guaranteed liberty, but
not equality.
During the Constitutional Convention of 1878–79, the issue of equality arose once again.
This time, two women pressed the issue. They were not delegates to the Convention, but they
lobbied those men who were, asking them to include specific provisions in the Constitution that
would guarantee equality to women in the areas of employment and education. They were
motivated by the fact that they both had been recent victims of sex discrimination. Clara
Shortridge Foltz (a suffragist and a housewife with five children) and Laura DeForce Gordon (a
sister-suffragist and newspaper publisher) had been barred from entering the legal profession by
a California statute that had provided that only white males could become lawyers. 37 Foltz had
responded by drafting the Woman Lawyer‘s Bill in 1877, and she and Gordon had lobbied
successfully for the Bill‘s enactment in that same year.38 In 1878, after reading law, both women
had been admitted to the bar—an event that had received national publicity. When the Hastings
College of Law opened its doors in 1878 as part of the University of California, both women had
applied unsuccessfully for admission. On February 10, 1879, Clara Foltz filed a lawsuit,
representing herself and seeking a writ of mandamus ordering her admission to the College of
Law.
On February 18, in response to the lobbying by Foltz and Gordon, the Constitutional
Convention adopted Article XX, Section 18, which stated: ―No person shall, on account of sex,
be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business, vocation, or profession.‖ On
February 26, the Constitutional Convention adopted Article IX, Section 9, which provided: ―No
person should be debarred admission to any of the collegiate departments of the university on
account of sex.‖ The two sections marked the first express guarantee of equal rights for women
in an American constitution.39 In March of 1879, the trial court judge ruled in favor of Clara
Foltz, relying on both the Woman Lawyer‘s Bill and on the recently drafted state constitutional
provisions. The Hastings Board of Directors decided to appeal. By the time the appeal was
argued to the California Supreme Court, the Constitution of 1879 had been ratified, and the court
34
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affirmed the writ of mandamus ordering that Clara Foltz be admitted to the Hastings College of
Law.40
The second case to be litigated under the 1879 equality provisions was In re Mary
Maguire.41 In 1881, Mary Maguire relied on Article XX, Section 18 to challenge a San
Francisco ordinance that provided: ―Every person who . . . employs any female to wait . . . on
any person in any dance-cellar, bar-room, or in any place where malt, vinous, or spirituous
liquors are sold, and every female who in such place shall wait . . . on any person, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.‖42 Mary McGuire had been arrested for violating the ordinance, and she
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.43 The respondent argued that the ordinance did not violate
Article XX, Section 18 because Mary McGuire had not been disqualified from waiting on
persons in a bar-room where liquors are sold ―on account of her sex,‖ but rather on account of
the fact that such employment of a woman is ―hurtful to sound public morality.‖44 Justice
Thornton, writing for the majority, took the position that while the state could enforce morality,
the constitution prevented the state from doing so by prohibiting women from engaging in lawful
employment.45 He buttressed his opinion by focusing on the command of Article I, Section 22
that ―[t]he provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by expressed
words they are declared to be otherwise.‖ He observed that there was no exception in the
Constitution that would authorize discrimination on the basis of sex for the purpose of promoting
public morality.46 The California Supreme Court ordered that Mary McGuire‘s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus be granted. Mary McGuire, along with Clara Foltz, had proven the power
of an express (albeit narrow) guarantee of equality.
Despite the lack of an express, general equal protection clause in the California
Constitution of 1879, the California Supreme Court announced in 1900 that an implicit principle
of equal protection existed in the 1879 Constitution.47 Article I, Section 21 of the 1879
Constitution provided: ―No citizen or class of citizens shall be granted privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens.‖ And Article I, Section 11,
stated: ―All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.‖ According to the court,
these two provisions, taken together, supported an implicit guarantee of equal protection in the
California Constitution.48
40

Foltz v. Hoge, 54 Cal. 28 (1879).
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The court considered both the explicit and the implicit guarantees of equality in the
California Constitution in Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,49 a 1971 case that was central to the court‘s
discussion of equality in the California Marriage Cases. The plaintiffs in Sail’er Inn held on-sale
liquor licenses and sought a writ of mandate to prevent the Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control from revoking their licenses because they employed women bartenders. Section 25656
of the Business and Professions Code prevented women from being hired as bartenders except
when they were licensees, wives of licensees, or shareholders of a corporation holding a
license.50 The plaintiffs contended that Section 25656 violated Article XX, Section 18.
Additionally, they claimed that it violated Article I, Sections 11 and 21, of the California
Constitution, and that it violated the federal Equal Protection Clause.
Turning first to the plaintiffs‘ claim under Article XX, Section 18, the California
Supreme Court ruled that Section 25656 was unconstitutional based upon In re McGuire.51 In
particular, the court said that ―mere prejudice, however ancient, common or socially acceptable,‖
is not a justification for discrimination against job applicants.52 It concluded by observing: ―It is
clear that bartending is a lawful vocation, that women are as capable of mixing drinks as men,
and that section 25656 nonetheless disqualifies the vast majority of women from entering the
bartending occupation.‖53
Although the court could have stopped with its holding in favor of the plaintiffs under
Article XX, Section 18, it went on to consider the plaintiffs‘ claims that they had been denied
equal protection under both the federal and state constitutions. The plaintiffs alleged that they
had been denied equal protection because Section 25656 prohibited women from tending bar
unless they or their husbands held a liquor license, but did not impose a comparable limitation on
men. The California Supreme Court took the position that the federal and state tests for a denial
of equal protection were ―substantially the same,‖54 and therefore it considered the federal and
state constitutional provisions simultaneously. The court then turned to the first issue, which was
determining the proper standard of review. The court said that it would apply the two-level test
employed by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing legislative classifications under the
Equal Protection Clause.55 It described that two-level test as one in which low-level scrutiny was
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applied in the area of economic regulation, and strict scrutiny was applied ―in cases involving
‗suspect classifications‘ or in cases touching on ‗fundamental interests.‘ ‖56
Moving to the second issue, the court held that Section 25656 contained a facial sexbased classification and that classifications based upon sex should be treated as suspect.57 The
court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had not designated sex-based
classifications as suspect,58 but it also observed that other courts ―have begun to treat sex
classifications as at least marginally suspect.‖59 It then analyzed those classifications that the
United States Supreme Court had already designated as suspect classifications, such as
classifications based on race or national origin. Four criteria emerged, including whether the
classification (1) was based upon an immutable trait; (2) bore no relation to ability and therefore
relegated a whole class of people to an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities of
the individual members of the class; (3) reflected a history of discrimination that created a stigma
of inferiority; and (4) burdened groups who were politically powerless. 60 Applying these four
criteria, the court found that sex was a suspect classification because (1) gender is an immutable
trait; (2) women are capable of being bar tenders; (3) women as a class have suffered from a
history of discrimination; and (4) women are politically powerless because, although they
obtained the right to vote in 1920, they remain ―underrepresented in federal and state legislative
bodies and in political party leadership.‖61 Sail’er Inn was the first case in the nation to hold that
sex is a suspect classification.
Turning to the application of strict scrutiny, the court placed the burden on the state to
establish that it had a compelling interest which justified the law and that the means were
necessary to further its purpose.62 The state asserted that its compelling interest was in
―preventing improprieties‖ in connection with the sale of alcoholic beverages, and it argued that
―women in bars, unrestrained by husbands or the risk of losing a liquor license, will commit
improper acts.‖63 The court was not persuaded. It found that the state had failed to prove a
compelling interest because there was no reason to believe that women bartenders would have
any less incentive than male bartenders to obey the gender-neutral statutes governing the sale of
alcoholic beverages.64 The court also observed that nondiscriminatory statutes constituted a
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preferable means to the end.65 Therefore, the court held that Section 25656 violated both the
state and federal constitutions.66
In 1974, California added Article I, Section 7(a) to create an explicit state constitutional
guarantee of equality akin to the federal guarantee of equal protection: ―A person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the
laws.‖ A new Article I, Section 24 emphasized the independence of the state constitution from
the Federal Constitution: ―Rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.‖ In 1976, based on these two new additions to the
state constitution, the California Supreme Court clarified the relationship between the state
constitution and the Federal Constitution: ―[O]ur state equal protection provisions, while
‗substantially the equivalent of‘ the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may
demand an analysis different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were
applicable.‖67 Consequently, it is now clear that sex continues to be a suspect classification
under the California Constitution, even though the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1976 68
that sex is only a quasi-suspect classification.69
2. Perez v. Sharp
In the California Marriage Cases, the court relied heavily on Perez v. Sharp,70 a
pathbreaking case in which the California Supreme Court struck down California‘s antimiscegenation statute under the Federal Constitution by a vote of 4-3. Even though Perez had
been decided under the Federal Constitution, the court in the California Marriage Cases treated
Perez as if it were also a state constitutional law precedent.
In 1947, Sylvester Davis (a black man) and Andrea Perez (a Mexican-American mestiza
with olive-colored skin regarded by law to be white) mutually agreed that they wanted to get
married.71 But when they went to the office of the Los Angeles County Clerk, the clerk denied
them a license72 because of California‘s anti-miscegenation statute, which stated: ―All marriages
of white persons with negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes are illegal
65
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and void.‖73 No marriage license could be issued to such interracial couples.74 California‘s antimiscegenation statute dated back to the first session of the legislature in 1850.75 Originally,
interracial marriage had been a crime in California (as it was in many other states), but in 1872,
the California legislature had amended its anti-miscegenation statute by removing the criminal
penalty and by declaring that interracial marriages are void. California‘s prohibition on
interracial marriage had one loophole: Sylvester and Andrea could have driven to Mexico to get
married, and then returned to California as a legally married couple.76 But, as devout Catholics,
they wanted to get married in Saint Patrick‘s Church in Los Angeles.77
Sylvester and Andrea knew Daniel Marshall, a white civil rights lawyer who also
worshipped at Saint Patrick‘s Church in Los Angeles, and he agreed to take their case. 78 As he
contemplated his litigation options, he realized that an equal protection challenge under the
Constitution of the United States would be met with the ―equal application defense.‖ 79 He also
realized that a substantive due process challenge would be met with the fear of resurrecting
Lochner.80 Therefore, he chose to emphasize the argument that California‘s anti-miscegenation
statute violated the ―free exercise of religion‖ clauses of both the state and federal
constitutions.81 On August 8, 1947, Marshall filed his complaint with the California Supreme
Court, requesting a writ of mandate that would direct the county clerk to issue a marriage license
to Sylvester and Andrea.82 The court agreed to exercise original jurisdiction and heard oral
arguments on October 6, 1947.83 Marshall‘s argument focused almost exclusively on the free
exercise challenge.84
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As Charles Stanley, the lawyer for the County, delivered his response to the free exercise
argument, Justice Traynor suddenly interrupted him by asking the first question of the day:
―What about the equal protection of the law?‖85 Justice Traynor pressed on: ―What legitimate
social purpose is served by this statute?‖ Stanley answered: ―[T]here is evidence that crossing of
widely divergent races will have detrimental biological results.‖ Justice Traynor expressed his
dissatisfaction with Stanley‘s answer: ―What you have to establish is not the validity of a law
preventing mixed marriages of races generally, but a law prohibiting the mixing of Caucasians
with any of the specified colored races.‖ Stanley struggled as he attempted to answer Justice
Traynor‘s question: ―I do not like to say it or to tie myself in with ‗Mein Kampf‘—but it has
been shown that the white race is superior physically and mentally to the black race, and the
intermarriage of these races results in a lessening of physical vitality and mentality in their
offspring.‖ With a hint of incredulity in his voice, Justice Traynor inquired: ―Are there medical
men in this country who say such a thing?‖
The California Supreme Court handed down its decision in Perez v. Sharp on October 1,
1948.86 Justice Traynor (joined by Justices Gibson and Carter) wrote an opinion holding that
California‘s anti-miscegenation statute was unconstitutional because it denied the plaintiffs the
fundamental right to marry and because it violated the equal protection of the laws.87 Justice
Edmonds cast the fourth vote to strike down California‘s anti-miscegenation statute, concurring
in the result. He found that the right to marry is ―grounded in the fundamental principles of
Christianity,‖ and therefore it is protected by the federal constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.88 Justice Shenk (joined by Justices Schauer and Spence) dissented on the grounds that
the state has the power to regulate marriage and that an anti-miscegenation statute must be
upheld pursuant to the equal application defense.89
The organization of Justice Traynor‘s opinion was brilliant. He knew that the respondent
was relying on the ―equal application defense.‖90 However, instead of opening with a discussion
of the equal protection clause and the ―equal application defense,‖ he began with a discussion of
the free exercise clause. He acknowledged that the regulation of marriage is a ―proper function
of the state,‖ and therefore the state may adopt reasonable regulations with an incidental impact
on religious practices.91 However, he said, if a marriage statute contains a ―discriminatory and
irrational‖ classification, then the statute unconstitutionally restricts ―not only religious liberty,
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but the right to marry as well.‖92 His reasoning made the transition from the free exercise of
religion to the fundamental right to marry.
Justice Traynor moved so swiftly to a discussion of the fundamental right to marry
because he was about to define the right to marry in a way that would permit him to escape from
the jaws of the ―equal application defense.‖ He first established that the United States Supreme
Court had recognized a fundamental right to marry during the Lochner era in Meyer v.
Nebraska.93 He then emphasized that marriage is ―something more than a civil contract subject
to regulation by the state; it is a fundamental right of free men.‖94 Consequently, he said that any
infringement of the fundamental right to marry must be based upon more than prejudice.95
Finally, he uttered the most famous words in his opinion: ―Since the right to marry is the right to
join in marriage with the person of one‘s choice, a statute that prohibits an individual from
marrying a member of a race other than his own restricts the scope of his choice and thereby
restricts his right to marry.‖96
Now Justice Traynor tackled the equal protection issue. He understood that the state‘s
equal application defense was premised on the assumption that California‘s anti-miscegenation
statute imposed an equal burden on both blacks and whites because each race was prevented
from marrying the other. However, he rejected the state‘s assumption: ―The decisive question …
is not whether different races are equally treated‖ because ―[t]he right to marry is the right of
individuals, not of racial groups.‖97 His definition of the fundamental right to marry had
rendered the equal application defense irrelevant.98 Justice Traynor also understood that the
United States Supreme Court still honored the ―separate, but equal‖ doctrine.99 However, he
said: ―A holding that . . . segregation [into separate facilities] does not impair the right of an
individual to ride on trains . . . is clearly inapplicable to the right of an individual to marry.‖ 100
Ultimately, Justice Traynor applied strict scrutiny to what he called a race-based classification,
and he ruled that California‘s anti-miscegenation statute violated the federal Equal Protection
Clause because it served no compelling state interest.101
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The newspapers in California and around the nation carried stories about the Perez
case.102 No one seemed to know exactly what to say about the unprecedented decision, which
may explain why it was not the topic of editorials, nor did it trigger any type of a nationwide
backlash. California officials declined to seek certiorari, and Andrea and Sylvester married the
following February in Saint Patrick‘s Church in Los Angeles. 103

3. California and Gay Rights.
California, and in particular San Francisco, has had a unique and supportive history with
respect to gay rights. The Mattachine Society, the first long-term gay rights organization in the
country, was established by Henry Hay in Los Angeles in 1950. Several years later, in 1955, Del
Martin and Phyllis Lyon founded the first lesbian organization, the Daughters of Bilitis, in San
Francisco. A third important gay rights organization, the Society for Individual Rights, was also
founded in San Francisco in the early 1960s.104
In the 1960s, gay rights litigation was virtually nonexistent.105 Nonetheless, California
courts handed down two landmark decisions. In 1967, at a time when most lesbian moms going
through divorce avoided custody challenges at very high costs, 106 a lesbian mom in California
challenged the trial court‘s denial of custody and won a ruling that lesbianism per se could not
bar a mother from custody.107 Two years later, the California Supreme Court bucked another
national trend by ruling that homosexuality per se was not a sufficient basis for removing a male
teacher from the classroom.108
Because society often used sodomy statutes to harass lesbian and gay men by classifying
them as potential criminals, lesbian and gay rights litigators in the 1970s began to challenge the
constitutionality of these statutes. Although litigators were sometimes successful at the trial
level, courts tended to reverse these cases on appeal.109 The legislature finally stepped in and
resolved the issue for the entire state by repealing the criminal statute in 1975, thereby joining a
102
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minority of approximately ten states that had previously decriminalized both opposite-sex and
same-sex consensual sodomy.110
In 1977, Harvey Milk won a seat on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, becoming
the first ―out‖ gay man to be elected to public office in California, and perhaps in the United
States.111 While in office, he helped pass a San Francisco ordinance banning discrimination
against gay people. A handful of other cities across the country had adopted similar, often
narrower, ordinances. Mostly small college towns, rather than large urban centers, enacted these
ordinances in the early 1970s.112
As gay rights claims became more visible in cities across the country, the backlash began.
Aided by the efforts of Anita Bryant, local ordinances protecting gay people that had been passed
in the mid-1970s were repealed in Dade County, Florida; St. Paul, Minnesota; Wichita, Kansas;
and Eugene, Oregon.113 In large part, these battles were waged as campaigns to save school
children from homosexual teachers. Nowhere was that message more clear than in the battle
over Proposition 6, the Briggs Initiative, on the ballot in the November 1978 elections in
California.
The Briggs Initiative, crafted by State Senator John V. Briggs, who had mounted an
unsuccessful campaign for Governor of California, claimed to be a necessary means to prevent
gay and lesbian teachers, and their allies, from teaching the state‘s youth that homosexuality was
an acceptable lifestyle. Briggs had been unable to shepherd a statute to this effect through the
legislature, and so he brought the issue directly to the people through the initiative process.114
Although the initiative appeared to be unstoppable six months before the election, voters
ultimately defeated the initiative 58.4% to 41.6%. As it turned out, the ―No on 6‖ campaign was
vastly better organized than the ―Yes on 6‖ group. Then-Governor Ronald Reagan sided with
the ―No on 6‖ campaign.
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After 1978, the California courts continued to rule against discrimination. Even before
Wisconsin‘s much heralded first-in-the-nation gay civil rights law took effect in 1982,115 the
California courts, applying state and federal constitutional provisions, as well as the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, recognized claims of discrimination raised by gay public employees, employees of
privately-owned public utilities, prospective tenants, and clients of all public accommodations.116
In the 1980s, attention shifted from concerns about discrimination to recognition of samesex relationships. Activists fought to get the City of Berkeley and the City of San Francisco to
enact domestic partner ordinances. The term ―domestic partnership‖ sought to define a legal
relationship for same-sex partners other than marriage, from which they were barred, and to
extend workplace benefits to domestic partners of city employees that were substantially equal to
the benefits that were provided to employee spouses. Harry Britt got such a provision through the
San Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1982, but then-Mayor Dianne Feinstein vetoed it. The
negative reaction in the gay community was so strong that Feinstein was subjected to a recall
vote shortly thereafter. Feinstein, generally a supporter of the gay community, survived the
recall. The firestorm, however, had brought national attention to the argument that same-sex
partners should be recognized as domestic partners and entitled to workplace benefits similar to
married couples.
The City of Berkeley became the first governmental entity in the country to recognize
―domestic partnership‖ status between two persons of the same sex and to provide some of the
benefits available to the spouses of city employees (initially dental and certain leave benefits, but
eventually medical insurance benefits as well). The City of West Hollywood was next, and it
extended its domestic partner ordinance to allow same-sex couples to register, whether or not
they were city employees and whether or not they sought any benefits from employers by
registering. The desire to have legal recognition of their relationships was so strong that many
couples felt there was a gain even though all they could do was register. Other California cities
followed Berkeley and West Hollywood. By 1999, at least twelve cities and four counties in
California had extended benefits to registered domestic partners. And 1999 marked the year that
the California legislature first enacted a statute that granted statewide recognition to same-sex
couples who registered with the state as domestic partners. While the benefits of registration
were limited in the early years, the number of rights available to registered domestic partners
under California law has continued to increase so that, by 2005, registered domestic partners
enjoyed most of the same benefits and responsibilities as spouses.117
California courts also have been at the forefront regarding recognition of parent-child
relationships in gay and lesbian families. The state‘s trial courts permitted the first secondparent adoptions, although the California Supreme Court did not affirm the practice until
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2004.118 And, in a trilogy of cases decided in 2005, the California Supreme Court strengthened
gay and lesbian families by recognizing parent-child rights and obligations, even in the absence
of second-parent adoptions.119
Thus, with respect to gay and lesbian rights generally, and even with respect to
relationship recognition outside of marriage, California‘s history indicates a supportive
environment for gay rights litigation. This history makes sense, given that California is a state in
which more-same sex couples reside than in any other state in the union. California‘s gains for
the gay community have included political representation, protection against discrimination, and
ultimately, protection for relationships. But this last area, relationship protection, has been the
most difficult to address. And California has been no different from other states in its resistance
to the concept of marriage equality, which many gay rights advocates view as the ultimate
protection for same-sex couples.
The history of same-sex marriage in California began in the 1970s. In 1971, California
had eliminated its gender-based distinction for capacity to consent to marriage.120 As a result,
the new statute, in gender-neutral terms, set the age of consent at eighteen for any ―unmarried
person.‖ Inspired by the post-Stonewall energy of a new gay rights movement, same-sex couples
in California began applying for marriage licenses, claiming that the statute permitted any two
unmarried persons to enter into a marriage.121 County clerks had always understood the statute
to apply only to opposite sex couples, so they declined these requests. Ultimately the county
clerks asked the legislature to amend the statute to provide explicit language restricting marriage
to a man and a woman. In 1977, the legislature revised the statutory language to provide that
―[m]arriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a
woman . . . .‖122 The push for the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples subsided.
In the 1980s, the marriage equality issue arose again. First the ACLU, and then the Bar
Association of San Francisco, went on record as endorsing the right of same-sex couples to
marry.123 In the early 1990s, same-sex couples in D.C., Chicago, Los Angeles, and other cities
applied for licenses. Some sued after their applications had been denied. These cases, brought
in state courts, claimed violations of state constitutions.
The first successful marriage case at the state level was Baehr v. Lewin.124 In 1993, the
Hawaii Supreme Court held that restricting marital partners on the basis of gender constituted
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sex discrimination, which, under the Hawaii Equal Rights Amendment, triggered strict scrutiny.
The high court remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether the government could
show a compelling justification for the marriage restriction.
Well before the trial court ruled on remand that the statute was unconstitutional, forces
around the country that opposed same-sex marriage began to mobilize. Arguing that activist
judges in Hawaii were about to force same-sex marriage on the entire country, these advocates
for heterosexual marriage lobbied their state legislatures to adopt bills prohibiting their states
from recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages. Utah was the first state to react to the threat
from Hawaii, passing a Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1995. In 1996, the federal
government and fifteen additional states joined Utah in enacting DOMAs. The federal DOMA
not only prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages at the federal level, but it also declared
that no state should be required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize a same-sex
marriage from another state.
In an ironic twist of fate, Congress passed the federal DOMA on the same day
(September 10, 1996) that the trial in the Hawaii marriage case began. The Hawaii trial court
ruled in favor of the same-sex couples on December 3, 1996. The court stayed the decision,
pending appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court. While the case was pending, the people of
Hawaii, in November 1998, amended the state constitution to provide that the legislature had the
power to define marriage, thereby validating the existing marriage statute, which limited
marriage to one man and one woman. Ultimately, the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed the case
in 1999. No same-sex couples were ever able to marry in Hawaii and yet the litigation produced
a backlash that resulted in the passage of thirty state DOMAs by 1999.125
California joined this backlash in 2000. Some California legislators had pushed for a
state defense of marriage act that would prohibit state recognition of same-sex marriages from
other states, but the bill never passed. State Senator Pete Knight, who had sponsored the bill at
least twice in the legislature, then turned to the people. Proposition 22, also known as the Knight
Initiative, appeared on the ballot at California‘s 2000 presidential primary. It passed by an
affirmative vote of 61% of the electorate.
The language of Proposition 22 was simple: ―Only marriage between a man and a woman
is valid or recognized in California.‖ This proposition was a statutory initiative, not a
constitutional amendment. Passing the measure would do nothing more than add a new section
to the Family Code. Because Section 300 of the Family Code, which had been amended in 1977,
already provided that marriage was a union between a man and a woman, some argued that
Proposition 22 was unnecessary. The proponents replied:
When people ask, ‗‗Why is this necessary?‘‘ I say that even though California law
already says only a man and a woman may marry, it also recognizes marriages from other
states. However, judges in some of those states want to define marriage differently than
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we do. If they succeed, California may have to recognize new kinds of marriages, even
though most people believe marriage should be between a man and a woman.126
Thus, although Proposition 22‘s language was broad enough to declare any same-sex
marriage performed in California void, the articulated intent of the proponents was to protect
California from having to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples that were valid in other
states.
By the time California voters went to the polls on March 7, 2000, everyone should have
known that Hawaii was no longer a threat. But a new state caused concern: Vermont. On
December 20, 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court had ruled that excluding same-sex couples
from the rights and benefits of marriage violated the ―equal benefits‖ provision of the Vermont
Constitution. The court did not automatically extend the rights and benefits of marriage to samesex couples, however. Instead, it asked the legislature to consider what appropriate remedy
would resolve the inequality. Ultimately, the legislature enacted a civil union bill, extending the
rights, benefits, and liabilities of marriage to same-sex couples who entered into a civil union.
After the success in Vermont, several additional marriage equality cases entered the
courts in other states. Between 2001 and 2003, advocates filed cases in Massachusetts (2001),
New Jersey (2002), Indiana (2002), and Arizona (2003). The Massachusetts and New Jersey
cases were brought by public interest litigators at the national level (GLAD and Lambda) who
had carefully chosen states where the political will to support the extension of marriage seemed
possible and where it was not easy for the general populace to overturn supreme court cases by
constitutional initiatives. The Indiana and Arizona cases, by contrast, were brought by local
ACLU lawyers, without much enthusiastic support at the national level.
In 2003, supporters of extending marriage to same-sex couples experienced their first
pure victory. Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, who wrote the majority opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,127
announced: ―[O]ur decision marks a change in the history of our marriage law.‖ Depriving
same-sex couples from ―access to the protections, benefits and obligations of civil marriage‖ is
―incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality
under law‖ and ―violates the Massachusetts Constitution.‖128 In a subsequent advisory opinion
to the state legislature, the court took the position that the only appropriate remedy would be the
extension of the institution of marriage (rather than civil unions) to same-sex couples.129
The Massachusetts decision set off another national backlash. While a handful of mayors
joined Gavin Newsom in early 2004 by supporting the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex
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couples in their jurisdictions, actions at the state level were much more negative. Before the
Massachusetts decision, only three states had enacted constitutional amendments banning samesex marriages.130 During 2004, thirteen additional states adopted such amendments.131
The backlash did not come as a surprise to the national public interest lawyers fighting
for marriage equality. They knew the battle was likely to be a long one–the inevitable process of
taking two steps forward and one step backward, a process experienced by all civil rights
movements. They sought to keep fighting while minimizing the setbacks. It did not make much
sense to bring cases in states where a strong majority of the population opposed marriages for
same-sex couples, especially if the people had the power to amend the constitution directly
through the initiative process. The ease with which many states could amend their constitutions
through the initiative power led public interest litigators to look for test case states in which
constitutional amendments had to be approved by the state legislature before being voted on by
the people. The other considerations for an ideal test case state were the existence of a state
legislature, as well as a judiciary, that had a positive record of support for gay rights issues, and
the presence of a population that tended to support more progressive causes. While California
seemed an attractive choice for future marriage litigation for many of these latter reasons, the
state‘s initiative process was a negative counterbalance.
California is one of sixteen states in which the general population can exercise direct
democracy and amend the state constitution without any consultation with the legislature.
California has become known as a state where the general population amends the constitution on
a regular basis, probably because the process is relatively easy. The first step, gathering
signatures in support of the initiative, requires the signatures of only 8% of the voters in the most
recent gubernatorial election. Only the State of Colorado has a lower signature requirement.132
At the next stage, when the initiative is placed on the ballot for a vote, only a simple majority of
those voting on the matter need to approve the initiative in order to add it to the constitution.133
Because of this initiative process and the passage of Proposition 22 by 61% of the voters
in the state, California had not been high on anyone‘s list as the best state for testing the marriage
laws in the courts. Mayor Newsom‘s actions, however, changed the landscape. Now California
emerged into the mix, but not because national gay rights lawyers identified it as a good test case
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state. Instead, Mayor Newsom, the City and County of San Francisco, and those individual
couples who had filed suit that February because they were simply tired of waiting for judicial
recognition of their rights made the decision to litigate.134
The Decisions
1. The Trial Court’s Opinion135
Judge Kramer, the trial court judge, acknowledged that he was deciding six consolidated
cases, but he chose to focus on ―the common issue‖ in all of the cases: ―[W]hether Family Code
section 300, which provides that a marriage in California is a union between a man and a
woman, and Family Code section 308.5, which provides that only a marriage between a man and
a woman is valid or recognized in California, violate California‘s Constitution.‖ Judge Kramer
also acknowledged that the parties in favor of same-sex marriage had challenged the Family
Code sections under the liberty, privacy, and equal protection provisions of the state constitution,
but he announced that he would resolve the cases solely under the equal protection clause. The
parties had chosen not to challenge the Family Code sections under the Federal Constitution
because they did not want the case to go to the United States Supreme Court. Instead, the parties
wanted the California courts to interpret the state constitution independently of the Federal
Constitution. Applying the law developed in Sail’er Inn and Perez, the standard for reviewing
the statute would be either strict scrutiny or deferential low-level scrutiny. The parties in favor
of same-sex marriage asserted that the statutes should be subjected to strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause because (1) they contained a suspect, facial, sex-based classification
insofar as they restricted marriage to a man and a woman; and (2) they also burdened the
fundamental right to marry. The parties against same-sex marriage responded by saying that the
Family Code sections should be subjected to low-level scrutiny because (1) they did not actually
discriminate on the basis of sex, since they were statutes of equal application; and (2) no
fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex existed. The Attorney General made the
additional argument that California‘s entire statutory scheme did not violate the state‘s equal
protection clause because the legislature had created two ―separate, but equal‖ family
institutions: marriage and registered domestic partnerships.
The trial court judge regarded Sections 300 and 308.5 as creating a facial, sex-based
classification that would ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny under Sail’er Inn. He then turned to a
consideration of the equal application defense. Relying on Justice Traynor‘s analysis in Perez,
he held that the equal application defense was not applicable in this case because the right to
marry is the right of individuals, not of groups. If a lesbian wants to marry the person of her
choice, she will marry a woman. And if a gay man wants to marry the person of his choice, he
will marry a man. Viewed from an individual rights‘ perspective, the equal burden on the class
of men and the class of women was simply irrelevant. The trial court judge noted that Perez had
been cited by the United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia (a challenge to Virginia‘s
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criminal anti-miscegenation statute under the Equal Protection Clause). In Loving, the Court
also had refused to recognize the equal application defense. And, prior to Loving, the United
States Supreme Court had overruled Pace v. Alabama136 in McLaughlin v. Florida.137
The Attorney General sought to distinguish Perez and Loving by saying that the statutes
at issue had not been race-neutral because they had prohibited interracial marriages selectively.
Thus, the real purpose of the statutes had been to maintain White Supremacy. The trial court
judge rejected the Attorney General‘s argument. He noted that, through dictum in Loving, the
United States Supreme Court had indicated that it would have struck down even a general
prohibition on all interracial marriages, since there is no compelling state interest in protecting
racial integrity.
The Attorney General then sought to distinguish both Perez and Loving on the ground
that, when California and Virginia banned interracial marriages, neither state had provided a
―separate, but equal alternative‖ (such as interracial civil unions). By contrast, the Attorney
General argued, when California banned same-sex marriages, it had created a ―separate, but
equal alternative‖ in the form of registered domestic partnerships. Therefore, the Attorney
General asserted, California‘s family law statutes should be characterized as nondiscriminatory
or else they should be subjected to low-level scrutiny. Judge Kramer rejected the Attorney
General‘s argument, citing Brown v. Board of Education.138 In Brown, the United States
Supreme Court had held that the provision of ―separate, but equal‖ educational opportunities to
racial minorities ―generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.‖139 The Court in Brown had
applied strict scrutiny to strike down the perceived race-based classification. Judge Kramer
thought that the same logic was applicable to the California Marriage Cases. Because registered
domestic partnerships generate ―a feeling of inferiority,‖ he announced that he would apply strict
scrutiny to this perceived sex-based classification. Nevertheless, just to be safe, he indicated that
he would also apply low-level scrutiny.
After determining that the Family Code sections created a sex-based classification, the
trial court judge turned to the issue of whether the statutes denied a fundamental right to marry.
The opponents of same-sex marriage argued that the fundamental right to marry, which Perez
and Loving had recognized was the ―right to marry a person of the opposite sex.‖ They asserted
that ―a fundamental right to same-sex marriage‖ had never been recognized in California.
Furthermore, they suggested that, if the right to same-sex marriage were deemed to be a
fundamental right, such a ruling would open the door to a brother marrying a sister and to an
adult marrying a child. Judge Kramer criticized this mode of analysis and rejected it in favor of
Justice Traynor‘s mode of analysis in Perez. He said that the point of the exercise is to
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determine whether a fundamental right exists and then to determine to what extent, if at all, the
government can limit that right. Citing to Perez, Judge Kramer found a ―fundamental right to
marry a person of one‘s choice.‖ Then, in dictum, he said that a state may preclude incestuous
marriages, and a state may also establish a minimum age for effective consent, thereby
eliminating the ―parade of horrible social ills‖ envisioned by the opponents of same-sex
marriage.
Having found both a suspect, sex-based classification and a fundamental right to marry a
person of one‘s choice, the trial court judge turned his attention to the state‘s primary
justification. Applying low-level scrutiny, he considered whether the Family Code sections
served a legitimate governmental objective because they honored the ―traditional‖ definition of
marriage. He ruled that, ―[e]ven under the rational basis standard, a statute lacking a reasonable
connection to a legitimate state interest cannot acquire such a connection simply by surviving
unchallenged over time.‖ The plaintiffs in the Proposition 22 and the Thomasson cases then
suggested that procreation was a legitimate state interest. Judge Kramer rejected their argument
based on the fact that one does not have to be married to procreate, nor does one have to
procreate to be married. Finally, Judge Kramer then applied strict scrutiny and, not surprisingly,
he found that the classification served no compelling state interest, since he had already found
that it served no legitimate governmental objective.
2. The Court of Appeal’s Opinion140
The Court of Appeal, by a vote of 2-1, in an opinion by Justice McGuiness (joined by
Justice Parrilli) reversed the trial court‘s equal protection ruling and held that the fundamental
right to marry does not encompass the right to same-sex marriage. Justice Kline, by contrast,
would have upheld the trial court judge on the grounds that the fundamental right to marry is
available to all, and that sexual orientation is a suspect classification (an issue which the trial
court judge had avoided, and which the California Supreme Court had not yet addressed).
Justice McGuiness first focused on whether there is a fundamental right to marry a person
of the same sex. He thought that the lawyers for the supporters of same-sex marriage really were
asking the court to redefine marriage. He took the position that the judiciary, unlike the
legislature, simply does not have the authority to extend marriage to same-sex couples.
Justice McGuiness acknowledged that, at first glance, the interracial marriage cases
might appear to provide compelling support for holding that same-sex couples enjoy the same
fundamental right to marry as interracial couples. However, on second glance, he concluded that
the central holdings of Perez and Loving are that laws prohibiting interracial marriage constitute
invidious racial discrimination in violation of the principle of equality.
With regard to the equal protection clause, Justice McGuiness ruled that the Family Code
sections did not discriminate on the basis of sex because they were subject to the equal
application defense. He concluded that Loving had only rejected the equal application defense in
the context of interracial marriage because the true purpose of Virginia‘s anti-miscegenation law
was to maintain White Supremacy. By contrast, in the California Marriage Cases, Justice
McGuiness found no evidence that California‘s opposite-sex definition of marriage discriminated
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against males or females, nor did he find any evidence that the definition had been enacted in
order to maintain discriminatory assumptions about gender roles.
Turning to Justice Kline‘s claim that the opposite-sex definition of marriage contained a
suspect, sexual orientation-based classification, Justice McGuiness agreed that the marriage
statutes implicitly classified on the basis of sexual orientation. As a practical matter, the Family
Code sections rendered marriage unavailable to same-sex couples, and therefore circumstantial
evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation existed. But Justice
McGuiness was unwilling to find that the classification was suspect because no proof of the
immutability of sexual orientation was available, since the trial court judge had not conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the issue. Once the court of appeal had concluded that sexual orientation
was a non-suspect classification, it upheld the Family Code sections at issue on the ground that
the opposite-sex definition of marriage was rationally related to the state‘s legitimate interest in
preserving the institution of marriage.
3. The Oral Argument
On the morning of March 4, 2008, the small formal courtroom in the Earl Warren
Building that houses the California Supreme Court when it is in session was packed. Because so
many spectators wanted to see at least some portion of the argument, the clerk allowed rotating
groups to sit in the courtroom for one hour each. The lawyers sat in a semi-circle just in front of
the wooden dais, with the onlookers to either side and behind them. Just behind the bench at
which the Justices would sit when they entered hung a large, imposing painting of a California
landscape by artist Walter Dixon, stretching the length of the entire wall and rising up to the
domed ceiling. The painting in the scene provided a sense of calm for the high emotions and
nerves rippling through the audience.
Eight different lawyers would participate in the oral arguments, which would last more
than three hours.141 Opening the argument for Petitioners and representing the City and County
of San Francisco was Therese Stewart, Chief Deputy City Attorney. Following her would be
Shannon Minter, Legal Director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, representing the
twelve San Francisco couples. Michael Maroko, a partner in the Allred firm, representing the
petitioners from Los Angeles (Robin Tyler and others) would argue third, and Waukeen McCoy
would argue last on behalf of the remaining San Francisco petitioners. Chris Krueger represented
the Attorney General‘s Office, followed by Kenneth Mennemeier of Sacramento, representing
Governor Schwarzenegger. It is unusual for the Governor to be separately represented in a legal
proceeding and several of the Justices, most notably Justice Kennard, questioned Mr.
Mennemeier about why that was the case. Apparently the Attorney General‘s brief, although
arguing that rational basis was the current appropriate level of review for sexual orientation, also
argued in the alternative, that if a heightened level of scrutiny were applied, then intermediate
scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, would be appropriate. The Governor, by contrast, wanted to
maintain that only rational basis review was appropriate.
The two private organizations arguing in support of respondents were the Proposition 22
Legal Defense Fund and Campaign for California Families, represented by Glen Lavy of the
Alliance Defense Fund and Mathew D. Staver of Liberty Counsel, respectively. Their arguments
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differed most notably from those advanced by the government respondents insofar as they sought
to justify the marriage restriction based on a governmental interest in procreation.
Chief Justice George, who would author the majority opinion that would reverse the court
of appeal, asked the opening question of Ms. Stewart: ―Is it your position that the use of the
terminology ‗marriage‘ itself is part and parcel of the right to marry and that that name could not
be changed by the legislature or by constitutional amendment . . . even if it were applied to all
persons?‖ She replied: ―Your Honor, it is our position that the state could not change the name
marriage for a number of reasons, one of which is that it would be somewhat akin to Prince
Edwards County deciding to shut down public schools just to avoid having to admit black people
to them.‖
During the time for rebuttal, Justice Kennard, who would join Chief Justice George‘s
majority opinion, followed up with a related question: ―Ms. Stewart, if the California legislature
were to enact the law providing that mixed race couples could not marry but they could register
as domestic partners, do you perceive a violation of the state constitution?‖ Ms. Stewart
responded: ―I think the court would strike it down in a heartbeat, Your Honor.‖ During the time
for rebuttal, Justice Werdegar, who would also join Chief Justice George‘s majority opinion,
asked Ms. Stewart whether the type of statute described by Justice Kennard would violate Perez.
Ms. Stewart responded by saying: ―Say we call it transracial unions instead of marriage. And I
just don‘t think the case would have come out differently. I think the court would have
recognized that marriage is a meaningful institution.‖
When Mr. Minter approached the podium on rebuttal, he said: ―Your honors . . . , with
apologies to Shakespeare, same sex couples come here today to praise marriage, not to bury it.
Petitioners deeply value the tradition of marriage and wish to participate in it with all the joy and
responsibility that that brings.‖ Chief Justice George said: ―I thought when you invoked
Shakespeare you were going to invoke the line: ―‛What‘s in a name?‘‖ After a ripple of laughter
was heard throughout the courtroom, Mr. Minter responded: ―Also would have been very
appropriate.‖ Then Justice Moreno, who would join Chief Justice George‘s majority opinion,
said: ―Also, with apologies to Shakespeare, I thought that you were going to say ‗a rose by any
other name would smell just as sweet.‘‖ Mr. Minter replied: ―Names are very important, your
Honor.‖ Thus, both at the outset and at the conclusion of the three-hour oral argument, it had
become clear that the major issues in the case were the ones that the trial court judge had
identified: ―What‘s in a name?‖ Was there a fundamental right of all persons in the state of
California to marry the person of one‘s choice under Perez? Or was the registered domestic
partnership system a ―separate, but equal alternative‖ to the institution of marriage? If not,
should the definition of opposite-sex marriage be subjected to deferential, low-level scrutiny
based on the recognition of the ―equal application defense?‖ Or, by contrast, should the
definition of opposite-sex marriage be subjected to strict scrutiny on the ground that it contains
either a sex-based classification or a sexual orientation-based classification that could be
characterized as a suspect classification under Sail’er Inn?
4. The Supreme Court’s Opinion142
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The California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-3, reversed the court of appeal‘s ruling.
Chief Justice George (joined by Justices Kennard, Werdegar, and Moreno) wrote the majority
opinion. Justice Kennard wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Baxter (joined by Justice Chin)
wrote one of the dissenting opinions, and Justice Corrigan wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
The dissenters, of course, agreed with the court of appeal. Justice Baxter took the
position that no fundamental right to same-sex marriage existed under the California
Constitution, nor did same-sex couples enjoy a constitutional right to the name ―marriage.‖ He
also took the position that no sex-based classification appeared in the statutes at issue because,
under the equal application defense, the statutes did not discriminate on the basis of gender.
Next, he observed that the statutes contained no facial sexual orientation-based classification.
He also refused to find circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation because he could not find any evidence that the statutes at issue were adopted for a
discriminatory purpose. On the contrary, he said that the legislation was simply intended to
maintain an age-old understanding of the meaning of marriage. Even if circumstantial evidence
of a classification on the basis of sexual orientation were present, he continued, the classification
would not be subject to strict scrutiny because the record contained insufficient proof that the
classification was suspect. Justice Baxter acknowledged a history of discrimination against
lesbians and gay men in California, but he found that the gay and lesbian community does not
currently lack political power, as evidenced by the recent enactment of the domestic partnership
statutes. Because Justice Baxter characterized sexual orientation as a non-suspect classification,
he applied deferential low-level scrutiny and found that the statutes at issue served a legitimate
governmental objective by preserving the traditional definition of marriage. He closed his
opinion with the following observation: ―If such a profound change in this ancient social
institution is to occur, the People and their representatives, who represent the public conscience,
should have the right, and the responsibility, to control the pace of that change through the
democratic process.‖ Justice Corrigan dissented separately to emphasize the degree to which she
agreed with Justice Baxter‘s closing observation.
Like Justice Traynor in Perez, Chief Justice George opened his opinion for the majority
of the court with a discussion of the state constitutional ―right to marry a person of one‘s choice,‖
and then he considered whether the statutes at issue violated the equal protection clause. From
the outset, however, he also had to distinguish the core issue in Perez from the core issue in the
California Marriage Cases. In Perez, the anti-miscegenation statute had simply voided
interracial marriages between a man and a woman. Therefore, in Perez, the central issue was
whether the ban on interracial marriages violated the constitutional right to marry. In the
California Marriage Cases, by contrast, the legislature had not only excluded same-sex couples
from the institution of marriage, but it also had enacted comprehensive domestic partnership
legislation. That legislation afforded to same-sex couples virtually all of the same substantive
legal benefits as California law affords to married couples. Therefore, the central issue in the
California Marriage Cases was whether, under these circumstances, the failure to designate the
official relationship of same-sex couples as marriage violated the California Constitution.
Chief Justice George began to tackle that question by dealing with the issue of whether
the lawyers for the same-sex couples were asking the court to recognize a narrow constitutional
right to same-sex marriage or a broad constitutional right to marry the person of one‘s choice.
He found that Perez had not recognized a narrow constitutional right to interracial marriage.
Rather, Perez had focused on what George called the substance of the constitutional right at
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issue—that is, the importance to an individual of the freedom to join in marriage with a person of
one‘s choice. Therefore, George considered his task to be examining the nature and the
substance of the interests protected by the constitutional right to marry. He noted that both Perez
and subsequent California decisions on the topic of family law had recognized repeatedly the
linkage between marriage, establishing a home, and raising children. He observed that both the
individual and society benefit from the institution of marriage.
Chief Justice George then considered the dual aspect of the constitutional right to marry.
On the one hand, it is a ―negative‖ right that insulates the couple‘s relationship from interference
by the state. On the other hand, it is a ―positive‖ right that requires the state to take at least some
affirmative action to acknowledge and support the family unit. He held that, while the
constitutional right to marry does not require the state to provide specific tax or other
governmental benefits, it does require the state ―to grant official public recognition to the
couple‘s relationship as a family,‖ ―to protect the core elements of the family relationship from at
least some types of improper interference by others,‖ and to provide ―assurance to each member
of the relationship that the government will enforce the mutual obligations between the partners
(and their children) that are an aspect of the commitments upon which the relationship rests.‖
Chief Justice George understood what a bold definition of marriage he had just written. He
could not cite to United States Supreme Court decisions to back up his definition of marriage.
Rather, he had to cite to a number of law review articles supporting the view that the
constitutional right to marry encompasses a positive right to have the state publicly and officially
recognize a couple‘s family relationship.143
Chief Justice George next determined who has access to the fundamental right to marry.
He concluded that the California Constitution must properly be interpreted to guarantee this
basic civil right to all individuals and couples, without regard to sexual orientation. Chief Justice
George had just announced the path-breaking holding that same-sex couples enjoy an ―equal
liberty‖ interest in the fundamental right to marry under the California Constitution.
Having defined the right to marry as a fundamental right, Chief Justice George then
applied strict scrutiny to the two sections of the Family Code that excluded same-sex couples
from the institution of marriage. He considered the argument that tradition was a compelling
state interest, but found that courts generally have not viewed tradition alone as a sufficient
justification for denying a fundamental constitutional right. Next, he refused to find that
procreation was a compelling state interest because the constitutional right to marry never has
belonged exclusively to individuals who are capable of having children. Finally, he considered
whether the promotion of ―responsible procreation‖ was a potential compelling state interest. He
acknowledged that a few recent same-sex marriage cases from other jurisdictions had recognized
―responsible procreation‖ as a legitimate governmental objective under low-level scrutiny.
Those cases had held that, because parenthood is always intended by same-sex couples, while it
may be unintended by opposite-sex couples, it is only opposite-sex couples who need the
institution of marriage. George refused to follow these precedents because he was applying
strict scrutiny. Furthermore, none of California‘s past cases suggested that the constitutional
right to marry belongs only to individuals who are at risk of producing children accidentally. Of
course, even if George had recognized that ―responsible procreation‖ was a valid state interest,
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the question would have remained why same-sex couples had to be excluded from marriage to
ensure that opposite-sex couples would enjoy its benefits. Having considered all three of the
compelling state interests asserted by the parties to the litigation, George concluded that the
fundamental right to marry guarantees same-sex couples the same constitutional rights as
opposite-sex couples to choose one‘s life partner and enter with that person into a committed,
officially recognized, and protected family relationship.
Chief Justice George then moved to what he considered to be the core issue in the case.
The Attorney General had argued that all of the substantive incidents of marriage have been
given to same-sex couples through the Domestic Partner Act. Therefore, the Attorney General
had claimed that the word ―marriage‖ was all that the state had denied to registered domestic
partners. For this reason, the Attorney General had taken the position that the fundamental right
to marry can no more be the basis for same-sex couples to compel the state to denominate their
committed relationships as marriages than it could be the basis for anyone to prevent the state
legislature from changing the name of the marital institution itself to ―civil unions.‖ Chief
Justice George left open the hypothetical question of whether the state constitutional right to
marry necessarily would afford all couples the constitutional right to require the state to
designate their official family relationships as marriages. For example, he refused to decide
whether the state could assign a name other than marriage to all couples in order to clarify the
fact that the civil institution of marriage is distinct from the religious institution of marriage.
Instead, he zoomed in on the actual issue before the court. That issue was whether there was a
violation of the constitutional right to marry when the state had granted the traditional
designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples and had assigned a different designation—
domestic partnership—to same-sex couples. In short, the question was whether separate family
institutions could adequately satisfy the California Constitution‘s guarantee of ―equal liberty.‖
George answered that question in the following words: ―[O]ne of the core elements of this
fundamental right [to marry] is the right of same-sex couples to have their official family
relationship accorded the same dignity, respect, and stature as that accorded to all other officially
recognized family relationships.‖ Therefore, he said, the current statutes posed a serious risk of
denying to same-sex couples the equal dignity and respect that is at the core of the constitutional
right to marry. Echoing Ms. Stewart‘s argument on behalf of the City, he concluded that the
court‘s holding in Perez would have been the same even if an alternative institution, such as a
―transracial union,‖ had been available to interracial couples.
Chief Justice George then shifted to a new topic by observing that the state‘s assignment
of different names for the official family relationships of opposite-sex and same-sex couples
raised constitutional questions under the equal protection clause. The lawyers for the same-sex
couples contended that strict scrutiny applied because the Family Code provisions at issue
contained sex-based and sexual orientation-based classifications, both of which should be
characterized as suspect. They also contended that their clients were entitled to strict scrutiny
under the fundamental interest strand of equal protection because the right to marry is a
fundamental constitutional right under the California Constitution. The Attorney General argued
that, if the state extends to a couple all of the substantive incidents of marriage, the state does not
violate a couple‘s constitutional right to marry simply by giving their official relationship a name
other than marriage.
Chief Justice George first ruled that the facial sex-based classification at issue was not
discriminatory because it was subject to the equal application defense. He distinguished Perez
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and Loving on the ground that they had involved racial classifications where there was proof of a
legislative purpose to maintain White Supremacy. Then he turned his attention to the question of
whether the case revealed circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation. He said: ―In our view, the statutory provisions restricting marriage to a man and a
woman cannot be understood as having merely a disparate impact on gay persons, but instead
may be viewed as directly classifying and prescribing distinct treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation.‖
The next question was whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification. Chief
Justice George was quick to acknowledge both the history of discrimination against lesbians and
gays in California and the reality that sexual orientation has no relationship to one‘s ability to
perform or contribute to society. He took the position that immutability is not invariably
required for a characteristic to be considered a suspect classification, citing to religion and
alienage as examples of mutable, suspect classifications. Moreover, he said: ―Because a person‘s
sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one‘s identity, it is not appropriate to require the
person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory
treatment.‖ When the Attorney General argued that lesbians and gay men are not politically
powerless, Chief Justice George observed that a group‘s current political powerlessness is not a
necessary prerequisite for treatment as a suspect class. If it were, then it would be impossible to
justify those decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect classifications.
Rather, as the court said in Sail’er Inn, the issue is whether ―outdated social stereotypes result in
invidious laws or practices.‖ And, in answer to that question, the court held that statutes that
treat people differently on the basis of sexual orientation should be viewed as constitutionally
suspect under California‘s equal protection clause. Chief Justice George‘s holding was
unprecedented both in California and across the nation. The California Supreme Court became
the first state high court to rule that sexual orientation is a suspect classification.
Chief Justice George was now ready to move to the final argument of the lawyers for the
same-sex couples that the Family Code sections deserved strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause because the statutes interfered with the fundamental right to marry. He found
that, by affording same-sex couples access only to the separate institution of domestic
partnership, the statutes at issue impinged upon the right of same-sex couples to have their
family relationships accorded equal respect and dignity. This holding reaffirmed Brown v.
Board of Education in the context of same-sex marriage. Just as there was a stigmatic harm that
occurred in Brown, so too there was stigmatic harm in the California Marriage Cases.
Consequently, Chief Justice George held that, ―in contrast to earlier times, our state now
recognizes that an individual‘s sexual orientation—like a person‘s race or gender—does not
constitute a legitimate basis upon which to deny or withhold legal rights.‖
The Aftermath and the Impact
The court released the lengthy decision in the case (over 150 pages) on May 15, 2008.
Many across the nation were glued to computer screens, having been alerted that the decision
would be available on the court‘s web page at 10 a.m. Others gathered at the Supreme Court
building, where copies of the opinion were made available at $10.00 a copy. Kate Kendell,
Executive Director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, says someone handed her a copy
of the decision and the press release and she felt that at that moment her entire life had come into
focus. This was the apex. Her team had won.
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People who did not have the benefit of the press release read the decision quickly,
looking for the first clear indication of the court‘s holding. At page 6, Chief Justice George, in a
sentence far too long and convoluted for speed-reading, finally pronounced:
[W]e conclude that, under this state‘s Constitution, the constitutionally based right
to marry properly must be understood to encompass the core set of basic substantive legal
rights and attributes traditionally associated with marriage that are so integral to an
individual‘s liberty and personal autonomy that they may not be eliminated or abrogated
by the Legislature or by the electorate through the statutory initiative process. These core
substantive rights include, most fundamentally, the opportunity of an individual to
establish — with the person with whom the individual has chosen to share his or her
life — an officially recognized and protected family possessing mutual rights and
responsibilities and entitled to the same respect and dignity accorded a union traditionally
designated as marriage.
The crowd at the Supreme Court building cheered. Plaintiff Jeanne Rizzo, who had been
next in line to get married in 2004 when the Supreme Court issued its stay, called her partner on
her cell phone and announced that it looked like they would be getting married after all.
The decision took effect 30 days after it was handed down. The first possible moment
that anyone could be married was at 5:01 p.m. on June 16. At precisely 5:07 p.m., Del Martin
and Phyllis Lyon were pronounced legally married by San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom.
They wore the same blue and purple outfits that they had worn for their 2004 ceremony. This
time they were surrounded by hundreds of friends and well-wishers.
At 4:30 that afternoon, in Beverly Hills, Robin Tyler and Diane Olson once again
approached the clerk in Beverly Hills to request a marriage license at 5 p.m. For the first time in
eight years, with a little thoughtful advance planning from the clerk, they got the answer they
wanted. License in hand, they moved outside the courthouse for their religious Jewish wedding
ceremony performed by Rabbi Denise Eger.
On June 17, lines formed at clerk‘s offices around the state. Couples who had planned
ahead already had appointments to get their licenses in places of heavy demand like San
Francisco. Jo Wilson and Carol Bennett came from Austin and were on the clerk‘s schedule for
June 17. Their granddaughter made a special trip to California so she could be a witness.
Because they were being wed in San Francisco, they wore flowers in their hair. A bag lady on
the street outside City Hall lent them some scissors to cut away the extra length of the garlands.
When Jo tried to compensate her for her help, the lady said that the extra flowers were all she
wanted.
Karen Stogdill and Kris Hill had been so excited when they read the Supreme Court
opinion that, unaware of the 30 day rule, they had rushed to City Hall to request a license within
ten minutes of the decision‘s publication. They were first told they could come back on June 16,
but that turned out to be wrong, and so they were married on June 17. John Lewis and Stuart
Gaffney, two of the plaintiffs in the case, also married on June 17. Jeanne Rizzo and Pali Cooper
were married by Mayor Newsom on September 5.
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On November 4, 2008, the people of California flocked to the polls to elect Barack
Obama as the first African-American president. They also faced Proposition 8, a ballot initiative
to amend the California Constitution to provide that only a marriage between a man and a
woman would be valid or recognized in the state. Obama won easily. So did the ballot
initiative, 52% to 48%. On November 5, same-sex couples applying for marriage licenses at San
Francisco City Hall were stunned by the following message:
ATTENTION SAME SEX COUPLES
Under the California Constitution an amendment becomes effective the day after the
election at which the voters adopt the amendment. Based on this provision and on the
Secretary of State's report of the semi-official results of the November 4 election relating
to Proposition 8, the County Clerk has ceased issuing licenses for or performing civil
marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples.
On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court upheld the validity of Proposition 8.144
The court also ruled that the 18,000 marriages celebrated by same-sex couples in California
between June 16 and November 5 were valid. At about the same time that the court issued its
Proposition 8 decision, two high profile lawyers, Ted Olson and David Boies, announced that
they had filed suit in federal court challenging Proposition 8 under the Federal Constitution.145
The final ending to the story of same-sex marriage in California is not yet known.
But the impact of this bold decision by the California Supreme Court, defining marriage
as a fundamental right for everyone and declaring sexual orientation a suspect classification to be
accorded the same strict scrutiny as race-based and sex-based classifications, outlives the
battering at the ballot box. Sexual orientation remains a suspect classification for future
constitutional cases in California. Advocates continue the political process, planning a new
ballot initiative to reverse Proposition 8.146
And the impact of this decision has been felt beyond California. In October, before the
November elections, the Connecticut Supreme Court followed California‘s lead, extending
marriage rights to same-sex couples and holding that sexual orientation classifications should be
accorded heightened scrutiny under the Connecticut constitution.147 The Supreme Court of Iowa,
construing a state constitution with language regarding inalienable rights that is very similar to
the language of California‘s constitution, ruled in favor of marriage equality on April 3, 2009.148
Shortly thereafter, the Vermont legislature became the first state legislature to extend marriage
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rights to same-sex couples.149 And, finally, echoing the words of Wendy Williams as she toasted
her sister‘s marriage during the ―Winter of Love,‖ for those of us who reveled in the wonder of
being able to marry the person of our choice before November 4, no one, not even the people of
the State of California, can take these marriages away from us. They are real.

149

The New Hampshire legislature has also extended marriage to same-sex couples, with the law becoming
effective January 2010. A similar bill passed the Maine legislature, but was repealed by a ―People‘s Veto‖ initiative
on November 3, 2009. The legislature is free to re-enact the same provision in the future. Similar marriage bills
have been introduced in other states.

35

